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FOURTEENTH-CENTURY PROMISES
MORRIS S. ARNOLD *
WE are all familiar with the paradox that while medieval English
society set great store in promises and their performance, the law
of its central courts paid them little attention. The marital arrange-
ment, which could be undone only rarely; the system we have
learned to call feudalism, infidelity to which was sometimes called
felony; the heavy emphasis in medieval literature on keeping faith:
all these support the proposition that an important tenet of medieval
morality was that promises ought to be kept. Yet the common law
of promises was curiously retarded, thus creating what seems an
odd gap between law and morality.
Explanations have not been wanting. Local courts, it is said,
carried much of the burden, at least until their jurisdictional limit
began to interfere with their effectiveness '; the church courts sup-
plied a measure of relief, on the sly as it were, under their jurisdic-
tion over breach of faith 2; and, moreover, promises were in fact
vindicated in common-law actions, the most notable of which was
debt on a bond, where the promissory element was disguised and
subverted but was nevertheless often fundamental to the arrangement
being enforced.' All these explanations contribute substantially to
our understanding of the medieval law of promise, and make less
dramatic the apparent inconsistency between the law and the society
it was designed to support. But it seemed to me that something
might be gained by looking at the fourteenth-century legal remedies
avowedly intended to redress the breach of promises, with an eye
to discovering how promises were dealt with in the relatively rare
circumstances when legal scrutiny was focused on them directly.
Along the way we shall see how, if at all, the moral idea that
promises should be observed made itself felt.
I. PROMISES GENERALLY
In 1320, Herle J. said that a covenant was "no more nor less than
an agreement between parties" '; and that relatively simple iden-
• Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. This article is based upon
a paper read at the Cambridge Legal History Conference, 9 July 1975.
On the jurisdictional limits of the local courts in the fourteenth century, see
Beckerman, "The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieval English
Personal Actions," in Legal History Studies 1972 (1975), 110.
2 See Helmholz, "Assumpsit and Fidel Laesio " (1975) 91 L.Q.R. 406.
3 This point was first made in Thorne, "Tudor Social Transformation and Legal
Change," 26 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 10 (1951).
4 2 Eyre of London 287 (H. M. Cam, ed., 1969).
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tity, between covenant and agreement generally, was reflected in a
very wide range of undertakings either being enforced by writs of
covenant or being denominated covenant in Year Book discussions.
A brief view of some of the arrangements thought of in the four-
teenth century in essentially promissory terms will make the point.
Agreements about the sale of land were of couirse very frequent,
and so one might make, or be asked to keep, a covenant to levy a
fine,5 to enfeoff,6 to put someone in seisin,7 or to make a mort-
gage.' Likewise, a buyer of land will want some title assurance, so
a promise to acquit, the forerunner of the modern covenant against
encumbrances, might be exacted,' or a promise to be free of suit
might be asked for."' A grantee of a wardship might well demand
a warranty, actionable by writ of covenant." Business deals and
compromises may be conceived of as covenants: two ecclesiastical
institutions may have a dispute over which of them is entitled to
the tithes of a certain territory and will make a composition, action-
able by writ of covenant, setting out a compromise 12; or two towns
may wish to grant each other immunity from tolls, pontage, murage,
and passage-to form a kind of common market in miniature. 3
These were nothing but covenants. Again, personal relationships
might be guided by covenants: one may promise another to feed
and clothe him, to find her a suitable husband,' 4 or, in a prenuptial
arrangement, not to alienate certain lands.15 One may also under-
take to receive another's nominees into religious houses,' or to be
his apprentice "7 or servant."' A covenant might be made to stand
to arbitration," to be a surety, 2" to build a sea wall,2' or to pay a
5 CP/40/403/252v.
6 CP/40/235/50v; Y.B. 13 Edw. 2, 407, the first unnumbered plea; CP/40/401/
276v.; Year Book 11 Richard ii, 10 (I. D. Thornley, ed., 1937) (per Clopton).
7 CP/40/207/193v.




12 CP/40/398/299; Y.B. 38 Edw. 3, f. 8, the third unnumbered plea; CP/40/
417/39; CP/40/421/219v.
13 Y.B. 39 Edw. 3, f. 13, the fourth unnumbered plea; CP/40/453/437; CP/40/4 54 /323v.; Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, f. 17, pl. 2.
14 Year Book 5 Edward H1, 216 (W. C. Bolland, ed., 1915).
15 Y.B. 15 Edw. 2, f. 460, the fifth unnumbered plea.
16 CP/10/443/315; CP/40/453/98v.
17 Year Book H1 Edward I1, 124 (J. P. Collas & W. S. Holdsworth, eds., 1942);
CP/40/453/319v.
Is Of course, these contracts were often enforced by writs on the Statute of
Labourers, called variously trespass or covenant; but the arrangement itself was
regarded as a covenant. Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 24, pl. 27; Y.B. 45 Edw. 3, f. 15. pl.
15; Y.B. 46 Edw. 3, f. 14, pl. 19; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 14, pl. 15; Y.B. 47 Edw.
3, f. 16, pl. 23.
19 Y.B. 26 Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 13.
2' 2 Eyre of Kent 9 (W. C. Bolland, ed., 1912).
21 2 Eyre of Kent 12 (W. C. Bolland, ed., 1912).
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debt.'2 A covenant may even give rise to a debt, as for board 11 or
money received by way of loan.'-"An easement in gross was said to
be enforceable by way of covenant.25 And here we enter that twilight
zone between right in rem and in personam: some thought that
the burden or benefit of a covenant might become attached to land
in some mysterious fashion. But there was no general theory about
how and when that could happen; and even Coke's prodigious
analytical abilities were not up to producing a believable synthesis.2"
The precedents are paltry and such discussions as are reported are
amateurish and tentative.27
This rather tedious rehearsal seemed necessary in order to demon-
strate the wide range and fairly large number of arrangements
that were analysed in terms of promise. Writs of covenant were
said in Year Book discussions to be available in the vast majority
of these situations and a very large number of them actually gave
rise to such actions. Covenant may have been something of a rara
avis, but the plea rolls reveal that it was not the extinct species
sometimes supposed.
II. THE TERM OF YEARS
But resort to the ideas of promise was most commonly had in that
area of the law that we today call landlord and tenant, that is, the
relationship between lessor and termor. The lessee's first line of
defence was a writ of covenant, for this was his remedy if his land-
lord should oust him.2 8 The reports or records of many such cases
indicate that a warranty was contained in the instrument creating
the tenancy 29; but most do not '0 and it seems that the warranty
was not necessary.31 Indeed, the express basis for the remedy is said
to be breach of "the covenant," by which, presumably, is meant
the lease itself. Phrases like "a covenant for a term of years" 3
are used to describe the term itself, and not merely the negotiations
22 Year Book 4 Edward 11, 85 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914).
23 CP/40/547/422v.
24 Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 26, pl. 1. 25 Y.B. 21 Edw. 3, f. 2, pl. 5.
26 See Co. Lift. 385a; 5 Rep. 17-18.
27 Y.B. 4 Edw. 3, f. 57, pl. 71, continued in 7 Edw. 3, f. 65, pl. 67; Y.B. 42 Edw. 3,
f. 3, pl. 14. The former case is discussed in McGovern, " Contract in Medieval
Law: Wager of Law and the Effect of Death," 54 Iowa L.Rev. 19, 47 et seq.
(1968).
28 See, e.g., CP/40/170/94v; CP/40/176/92v; CP/40/192/231v; CP/40/217/134:
CP/40/282/130; CP/40/396/276; CP/40/412/53; CP/40/421/170; Y.B. 47
Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 11; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 24, pl. 61; CP/40/465/358v. See also
Y.B. 19 Edw. 2, f. 642, the second unnumbered plea.
29 See, e.g., CP/40/172/231v.; CP/40/217/134; CP/40/396/276.
30 See, e.g., CP/40/170/94v.; CP/40/176/92v.; CP/40/412/53; CP/40/421/170;
Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 11; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 24, pl. 61.
31 See the remarks of Finchdean J. in Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, f. 1, pl. 4 at f. 2.
32 Year Book 4 Edward U1, 148, 149 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914).
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leading up to its creation; and so, at least for some purposes, a lease
for years seems to have been regarded, as we would say, as a con-
tract for possession. Indeed, Chief Justice Herle said that a termor
had no estate 13; and while it is not easy to give precise content to
that view, one of its functional consequences might have been to
make it easier to see a lease as essentially a covenant, or collection
of covenants, between lessor and lessee.
If the termor were ousted by one claiming by purchase through
his lessor, rather than by the lessor himself, the usual remedy was
by quare eiecit, or occasione cuius vendicionis as it was otherwise
known, against the ejector.3 4 But he might also sue his lessor in
covenant, and this again evidently without a supporting warranty
or express promise not to enfeoff or lease to another.35 Chief Justice
Belknap suggests that the writ of covenant ought to be counted on
specially in this case, but he does not say precisely what matter
should be included.3 6 What we have here is a kind of embryonic
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; but there is no evidence in
the fourteenth century that the implication would extend so far as
to include ejectments by persons claiming under paramount title.
Of course, if the ejectment were by a total stranger, then no action
would lie against the lessor on the "implied covenant " or even on
an express warranty, even though .the latter warranted against
omnes gentes.37 The remedy was against the ejector and was a
special writ en son cas,31 although some argued that in this circum-
stance it was up to the lessor to recover the freehold by novel
disseisin and then the term was recoverable from him in covenant.3"
Later in the century the remedy became ejectment which could be
brought against anyone ejecting, even the lessor himself. Thereafter
covenant seems less often used to remedy an ouster, perhaps
because the courts would, intermittently at least, allow the term
33 Y.B. 7 Edw. 3, f. 45, pl. 8.
34 T. F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed., 1956) p.
571.
35 See Y.B. 46 Edw. 3, f. 4, pl. 12, where the action is expressly upheld. The action
is also said to be available during the course of the argument in Year Book 6
Edward 11, 222 (P. Vinogradoff & L. Ehrlich, eds., 1918) (per Scrope).
36 Y.B. 6 Rich. 2, Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 200. But he also says that if
one is ejected by a stranger, by which I take it he means someone altogether
unconnected with the parties to the lease, the remedy is quare eiecit. This is
almost surely wrong and makes his other remarks somewhat suspect.
37 But see Year Book 2 & 3 Edward H, 84, 87 (F. W. Maitland, ed., 1904) where
Herle seems to say that covenant lies against the lessor if a stranger ousts the
termor.
38 In Year Book 6 Edward II, 226 (P. Vinogradoff & L. Ehrlich, eds., 1918) such
a writ was expressly upheld against the objection that it was against common
form and was not approved by the council.
39 Idem. (per Miggeley).
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itself to be recovered in ejectment. To my knowledge, this was first
allowed in 1389.40
Because leaseholds were regarded as essentially contracts for
possession, their devolution at death gave a problem at first. In 1311
a lessee's heir sued in covenant, apparently for possession of the
leasehold, and was met with the objection that it was his ancestor
who was evicted and thus no wrong was done to him. Staunton J.
said that some of his associates believed that there was such a thing
as a perpetual covenant, but "a covenant for a term of years is
like a chattel" and recovery might rather belong to the executors
of the lessee than to his heir."1 And in later years, while it is ad-
mitted that the benefit of some covenants survive death in favour
of heirs4 2 executors are seen bringing actions of ejectment.'"
Assignees of the termor seem to have been recognised very early
as capable of bringing actions for possession in covenant, 4 and
while there seems no reason why they should have been denied the
other remedies, I have no examples. Similarly, the heirs of lessors
became liable in covenant not only for evictions made by their
ancestors 45 or persons claiming under them,' 6 but also for their own
acts of eviction.'1 Despite the common-law reluctance to allow
assignment of promises, the lessor's assigns were as well bound by
the lease, although Percy, in a fit of adversarial heat, seems to have
opined in 1374 that if the lessor's assignee ousted the tenant, the
only action was against the original lessor.4 ' Finchdean J. said that
was a surprising error for so wise a man as he was to make."
What we have here is an example of how all the phenomena of
property can be counterfeited by resort to the idea of promise. Com-
mon lawyers had learned to do that two centuries earlier when the
attributes of alienability and heritability had been manufactured by
laying them at the door of warranty."'
40 CP/40/519/113. Only a few years earlier, in the sixth year of Richard II, Chief
Justice Belknap had said that such a result was impossible because ejectment was
only a writ of trespass and neither the term nor future damages were recover-
able in it. Y.B. 6 Rich. 2, Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 200.
41 Year Book 4 Edward 11, 148 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914).
42 See, e.g., Y.B. 2 Edw. 3, f. 3, pl. 14. See also Herle's remarks in Y.B. 7 Edw.
3, f. 65, pl. 67, where he talks of " perpetual covenants."
43 See CP/40/482/118; CP/40/484/287v.
44 In Year Book 4 Edward 11, 173 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1926) it is admitted that a
lease was assigned and in Y.B. 19 Edw. 2, f. 654, the first unnumbered plea, an
action is brought by an assignee of an estate for years. In CP/40/475/358v. a
lease is said to have been assigned, and assigns are expressly warranted in
CP/40/483/512v. 45 Year Book 4,Edward 11, 148 (G. J. Turner ed., 1914).
46 Y.B. 19 Edw. 2, f. 654, the first unnumbered plea.
47 Y.B. 15 Edw. 2, f. 454v., the first unnumbered plea. 48 Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, f. 1, pl. 4.
49 Idem. The exact meaning of Percy's and Finchdean's remarks is not free from
doubt.
50 See generally, Thorne, " English Feudalism and Estates in Land " (1959) 17
C.L.J. 193.
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That leases were promises may also account for the odd fact that
in a disproportionate number of fourteenth-century leases, perhaps
a majority, a religious house was the lessor. Canon law regulated the
disposition of church property, and religious houses may have been
restricted to alienation by lease in most circumstances. But it is
likely that a more influential factor was that leases were somewhat
precarious affairs and were not likely to be acceptable in certain
feudal circumstances; for if the lessor died leaving a minor heir, the
lease was no good against the lord."' This result is attributable to
the essentially contractual nature of leases: the duty to deliver
possession or pay damages descended to the lessor's heir, but the
lord, who was not privy to the promise, could exert his paramount
title. The lessee was but a promisee, not a full-fledged grantee. 2
Of course if there was a warranty, the heir would be liable to the
lessee on it 53 and, even without a warranty, the heir would be
obligated to put the termor back in possession, if any of the term
remained after he reached his majority, because he was liable on his
ancestor's lease.' But the termor obviously did not want this kind
of nuisance and that may account for the fact that so many leases
were given by religious houses: those institutions never died and
thus never had their lands taken into their lords' hands for
minority. 5
51 Year Book 2 & 3 Edward 11, 84 (F. W. Maitland, ed., 1904) is an example.
52 One ruse devised to evade the lord's right was to enfeoff the termor in fee " in
insurance of the term"; but if the jury found bad faith the lord could enter
anyway. See Y.B. 18 Edw. 2, f. 602, the third unnumbered plea, and Y.B. 15
Edw. 2, f. 454v, the first unnumbered plea. For other evasive tactics, see J. M.
W. Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism (1968) p. 21 et seq. Professor Bean
there indicates his belief that the lord's ability to ignore his tenant's leases
disappeared in the early fourteenth century.
53'. Year Book 2 & 3 Edward 11, 84, 87 (F. W. Maitland, ed., 1904) (per Westcote).
54 See the discussion in Y.B. 18 Edw. 2, f. 602, the third unnumbered plea.
55 The lord's ability to oust a termor also probably explains why most leases were
for a short term: a long term increases the possibility of the lease being
interrupted by the lessor's death. A sampling of plea roll and Year Book cases
involving leases reveals the following terms: Two years: CP/40/412/53. Three
years: CP/40/552/345. Four years: CP/40/183/512v.; CP/40/287/39. Six
years: CP/40/170/99v.; CP/40/387/161; CP/40/503/629v.; Year Book 11
Richard 11, 36 (I. D. Thornley, ed., 1937). Seven years: Year Book 6 Edward
11, 222 (P. Vinogradoff & L. Ehrlich, eds., 1918); CP/40/282/130: CP/40/446/
136v.; Year Book 11 Richard I, 211 (I. D. Thornley, ed., 1937); CP/40/475/255.
Eight years: Year Book 2 & 3 Edward 11, 84 (F. Maitland, ed., 1904);
CP/40/1921231v.; Year Book 10 Edward I, 57 (M. D. Legge & W. S. Holds-
worth, eds., 1935). Ten years: CP/40/176/92v.; Y.B. 19 Edw. 2, f. 654, the first
unnumbered plea; Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 5, pl. 11; CP/40/429/496; CP/40/453/
165; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 11; Y.B. 38 Edw. 3, f. 33, the second unnumbered
plea. Eleven years: CP/40/441/234v. Twelve years: Year Book 6 Edward I1, 226
(P. Vinogradoff & L. Ehrlich, eds., 1918). Thirteen years: Year Book 10 Edward
1I, 4 (M. D. Legge & W. S. Holdsworth, eds., 1935); CP/40/217/89. Twenty
years: Year Book 4 Edward I1, 148 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914); Year Book 4
Edward II, 173 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1926); Y.B. 19 Edw. 2, f. 642, the second
unnumbered plea: CP/40/396/276; CP/40/421/170; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 24, pl.
61; CP/40/465/358v.; CP/40/519/113. Twenty-one years: Y.B. 6 Rich. 2,
Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 190v. But see CP/40/482/118 for a lease of 100 years.
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Other obligations and rights arising in the landlord-tenant
relationship were gathered around the idea of promise. Covenants
to repair provided the most litigation, and in one form or another
they were included in many leases. Of course the termor was under
a common-law duty not to commit waste and was subject to the
statutory waste actions. '.6 A mere covenant not to commit waste,
therefore, would add nothing to his duty; indeed, in 1310 or there-
abouts an action of covenant was brought by a lessor against a
termor who had forfeited his estate to the remainderman on
account of waste, and it was allowed even without specialty":
since this was a cormmon-law duty absent an express undertaking
anyway, a covenant would be implied. Otherwise the forfeiting
termor would escape liability to his lessor, and this, Chief Justice
Bereford said, "would be great hardship." "
Usually, then, a covenant to repair was included in a lease to
give more precise definition to the termor's responsibility than
was to be gleaned from the rather vague law of waste. What we
call permissive waste was a particularly unsettled area; and a
covenant would naturally be helpful in defining this kind of duty. 9
So a provision precisely describing the buildings to be repaired and
the kinds of repairs generally expected might be framed. Usually
repairs were made at the tenant's expense, but some leases pro-
vided that certain unusually burdensome repairs as, for instance, of
sea walls, might be made by the lessee at his landlord's expense ";
and sometimes the lease would provide for deduction from the rent
of reasonable expenses so incurred. But it was apparently the rule
that such expenses could be withheld from the rent even without
a specific covenant to that effect; when in 1389 it was asserted
that "the deed does not prove that he was to repair [the house]
out of the rent," 61 Chief Justice Belknap asked rhetorically: "Do
you wish to put him to his action when he has a penny already in
hand? "62 Often the covenants would provide what state each
parcel of the leasehold was to be left in, that is, whether planted
and if so with what,6" and what stock and furniture was to be there
at the end of the term. 64
56 The provision most frequently employed against termors was the Statute of
Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278).
57 Year Book 4 Edward 11, 171 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1926).
58 Idem at 172. An abridged version of the case appears in idem at 192.
59 There was no implied covenant to return the premises in the state in which they
had been leased. See Year Book 7 Edward 11, 32 (W. C. Bolland, ed., 1922).
60 See, e.g., the leases in CP/40/475/255 and CP/40/483/512v.
61 Year Book 11 Richard 11, 36, 37 (I. D. Thornley, ed., 1937).
6I Idem.
63 See, e.g., CP/40/381/161; Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 5, pl. 11.
64 CP/40/387/161.
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But the most common covenant provided that the termor was to
leave the premises in adeo bono statu . . . sicut ea recepit."5 This
one caused a great deal of trouble, because the courts were reluc-
tant to apply the language literally when the loss complained of was
caused by an act of God or "sudden adventure "-lightning, storms,
or great winds. The rule was that in waste, even if the lease con-
tained such a covenant, no such insurer's liability would be en-
forced 66; but if the action were one of covenant the promise was
obviously to the forefront and discussion centred on the scope of
the risk assumed. The defendant would say that he was liable only
for fault or lack of due care; the plaintiff would say the lessee by his
covenant assumed all risk of destruction. 7 No definite resolution of
the difficulty was arrived at in the fourteenth century. 6
As with the duty to repair on the tenant's part, a lessor's duty to
acquit of services demanded by a chief lord was sometimes vindica-
ted by resort to the idea of promise. Of course there was a general
duty of this sort incumbent on a lord to a tenant in fee, "as in the
right between lord and tenant" as Scrope J. had it in 1311 69; but
if there was no landlord-tenant relationship, then covenant had to
be resorted to,"0 or, probably, in any case if the estate was only a
term of years. Thus, as Scrope J. said: "There is ... also another
sort of acquittance where a man binds himself by his own deed." "'
As we would say, the duty might arise by status or contract; and in
the latter case "the tenant shall have a writ of covenant by virtue
of the deed." 72 In the former case, the writ of mesne was available,
but covenant was said to be an acceptable alternative. 3 Further-
more, privity of contract with the original lessor survived a grant
of the reversion even after attornment.14 The covenant to acquit
was one of the so-called "perpetual covenants" of which the Year
Books occasionally speak; indeed, Belknap said in 1368 "that it
runs with [or rather lies on] the land" "5; but the heir was not
bound unless he had assets by descent in fee simple from his
ancestor."6
65 Y.B. 50 Edw. 3, f. 27, the first unnumbered plea is an example.
66 Y.B. 43 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 16; cf. Y.B. 49 Edw. 3, f. 1, pl. 1.
67 For discussions, see Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 5, pl. 11
68 In Year Book 11 Richard I1, 211 (1. D. Thornley, ed., 1937), such a covenant
was relied on, but when the defendant pleaded an act of God (lightning) the
plaintiff traversed, thus avoiding the issue of the legal sufficiency of the plea.
69 Year Book 5 Edward 11, 281, 283 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1947).
7. In Year Book 4 Edward If, 102 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914), Friskeney tried to
maintain that " reversion binds a man to ... acquittance " but his view was not
accepted. 71 Year Book 5 Edward I1, 281, 283 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1947).
72 Idem. See also Y.B. 45 Edw. 3, f. 27, pl. 20 at f. 28, where Finchdean speaks
of the duty to acquit in terms of covenant.
7.3 Year Book 10 Edward 11, 2 (M. D. Legge & W. S. Holdsworth, ed. 1934).
74 Year Book 4 Edward 11, 99 (G. J. Turner, ed., 1914) (per Malberthorpe).
75 Y.B. 42 Edw. 3, f. 3, pl. 14. 76 See CP/40/506/120.
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Of course there were other kinds of undertakings that might find
their way into leases. A lessee might promise not to lease the pre-
mises to another,"7 to lease only to a certain group of persons,78
personally to inhabit the premises,7" to build a house on the premises
to certain specifications,"0 to manure the lands of the manor,81 or
to pay part of the rent to someone other than the landlord.8 2 All
these were, of course, actionable by writ of covenant.
Rent itself, however, was only rarely claimed by way of covenant;
in fact, I have seen only one such instance. 3 Rent was so real, so
corporeal, that an action of debt was the usual remedy; rent
was "reserved" like an estate, and one fourteenth-century lawyer
even said that mere non-payment was a sufficient disseisin to give
rise to the assize. Even though it was admitted that a rent charge,
unlike a rent service, commenced by covenant, 4 rent charges were
not, strictly speaking, conceived of as promises but as rights in rem;
and we ought probably to resist the temptation, as some legal his-
torians have not, to call them "covenants that run with the land." 80
But in any event, leases very often provided methods of assuring
rent payment; and sometimes the rent was made a charge on the
land so that distress was possible,88 or a provision doubling the rent
upon failure to pay might be included. 7 But usually a right of
entry for condition broken was reserved 88; and this was commonly
done as well in the case of other duties or covenants.88 These are all
framed as rights of entry, and not as possibilities of reverter; and
often a grace period is given to allow cure of the breach. Even
when no such period was provided, it may have been the rule that
formal demand was necessary prior to entry. ° But even with these
rights of entry we may have not as yet abandoned the idea of
77 CP/40/548/306.
78 Y.B. 38 Edw. 3, f. 33, the second unnumbered plea.
70t CP/40/548/306.
El CP/40/429/495. The specifications were in another indenture which was incor-
porated by reference into the main indenture setting forth the lease.
81 CP/40/505/400v.
82 CP/40/217/134. See also Year Book 10 Edward 11, 4 (M. D. Legge & W. S.
Holdsworth, eds., 1935). 83 CP/40/387/161.
84 Y.B. 8 Edw. 3, f. 47, pl. 28 (per Scrope).
85 The cases in Year Book 12 Edward 11, 4 and 86 (J. P. Collas & T. F. T. Pluck-
nett, eds., 1950), involving rent charges, are indexed as "covenants that run with
the land."
86 CP/40/421/373. See also Y.B. 45 Edw. 3, f. 11, p. 17 at f. 8 (per Kirton).
87 Y.B. 45 Edw. 3, f. 11, p. 17 at f. 8 (per Kirton).
88 CP/40/396/276; Y.B. 38 Edw. 3, f. 33, the second unnumbered plea: CP/40/'
•441/234v. Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 11; Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 24, pl. 61; CP/40/
475/358v.; CP/40/483/512v.; CP/40/548/306 (life estate).
89 Y.B. 38 Edw. 3, f. 33, the second unnumbered plea (promise not to lease a
mill to anyone but a villein of the lessor or a miller); CP/40/441/234v.(covenant against commission of waste); CP/40/548/306 (life estate; covenants
to repair and against assignment).
90 See Y.B. 47 Edw. 3, f. 12, pl. 11.
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promise. For in the reign of Edward II a termor whose lease
allowed the lord to distrain would not let him do so, and the indig-
nant lessor brought an action of covenant to enforce the right.'
It may be, then, that rights of entry could have been enforced in
the same way, as we would say on the theory that the right of entry
implied a promise on the part of the lessee to move aside. 2 But I
have seen no example of the employment of such a theory.
III. SOME MORE PROMISES
A few words ought to be said about assumpsit and actions on war-
ranties of quality in the sale of goods, both of which appeared in
the common-law courts in the fourteenth century. When in 1364
issue was reached for the first time in an assumpsit writ in the
King's Bench, the plaintiff claimed the defendant had faithfully
promised (fideliter promisisset) to make his hand as sound as any
London surgeon could make it; and he said that he had lost his
hand through the defendant's negligence or malice, 'thus high-
lighting in a dramatic way the tortious, trespassory element of the
defendant's activity. 3 The cases in the King's Bench immediately
succeeding con'tain essentially the same allegations, except the alter-
native accusation of malice is sometimes omitted. 4 In one, the
defendant's answer uses interchangeably the verbs "to promise"
(promittere), "to covenant" (convenire), and "to undertake "
(manucapere), to describe the plaintiff's allegation, which, of
course, the defendant denied. Even when tortious elements are
included in the writ, then, issue may be taken on the promise alone.
In the Court of Common Pleas, the first such case to come to
issue was against a carrier who,'it is said, agreed (assumpsit) to
carry grain safe and sound (salvo et secure) from Hedon to Holder-
nesse in York. In this case no allegation of the defendant's malice
is made; the count says that the boat ended up on a sandbar
because the defendant navem .. . tam incaute et necligenter ...
gubernavit quod per defectum regiminis navis illius frumentum
predictum . . . totaliter amissum fuit. But there is also included a
count of assault and battery vi et armis. The plaintiff was evidently
on the boat and was injured; and probably he seized on this to give
trespassory colour to his action. 9 The. use of the word assumpsit,
1 CP/40/180/156v.
92 See McGovern, "The Enforcement of Oral Covenants Prior to Assumpsit," 65
Northwestern L. Rev. 576, 591 et seq., where the author argues convincingly
that in the fourteenth century rights of entry were conceived of as covenants






in the place of promisit, too, was perhaps motivated by a wish to
give the writ as tortious a cast as possible. Assumptere (emprendre
in French) was what someone did when he took a duty on himself;
as, for instance, when a person entered a religious order, 6 or one
of several defendants claimed the entire interest in a property in
litigation."7 Moreover, an embracer was defined in 1366 as one
que emprent sur luy de faire lenquest comparer; and a maintainer
was someone who took it upon himself to defend suits in return for
a share of the proceeds. 9 The idea, then, is one of a duty volun-
tarily undertaken, a risk one puts on one's self. I am not suggesting
that the idea is significantly different from promise at bottom. But
the pleaders needed all the help they could get to avoid the effect of
the objections that were raised anyway: that this was really an
action on a covenant and therefore a specialty ought to be pro-
duced, or that wager of law should lie."' Indeed, Cavendish J. in
1374 said assumpsit was a writ of covenant.' In any case, by the
end of the century we find assumpsit used to recover consequential
damages for promises not performed on time, and without allega-
tions of negligence or lack of care. The promissory element was
beginning to take on a life of its own and allegations of trespass
were apparently thought by some to be unnecessary for a good
cause of action.
Warranties of the quality of goods initially faced the same kind
of difficulties. The writ claimed that the seller while warranting the
goods to be sound knew they were in fact defective in some parti-
cular. A Year Book reporter tells us that the first time a warranty
writ in common form was upheld was in the sixth year of Richard
II.2 The report of that case ' reveals that the objections immediately
taken were that it was a writ of covenant and therefore should
have been commenced by summons and not attachment; that a
specialty was required; and that wager of law should lie. These
challenges were held unsound because the action was not taken on
the warranty but on the defendant's deceit. Much the same objec-
tions were raised when the action next was attempted, and the
plaintiff's response was that it was a writ of trespass on the case
which sounded in falseness and deceit; and the defendant nosa pas
96 See, e.g., Y.B. 40 Edw. 3, f. 37, pl. 11: "... quia habitum religionis assump-
sit..."
97 See, e.g., Y.B. 41 Edw. 3, f. 20, pl. 6: ... emprist tenancy del entirety...
98 See the Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. I, c. 25 (1275). The word " covenant"
is also used in this statute to describe the agreement between maintainer and
litigant.
99 See, e.g., Y.B. 41 Edw. 3, f. 6, pl. 11. Iden.
2 See Y.B. 7 Rich. 2, Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 206: " Similis materia anno
sexto regis ... ou tiel bref fuit primez maintenable come ieo crey etc."
3 Y.B. 6 Rich. 2, Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 192.
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demourer.4 Thereafter the rolls reveal a sprinkling of such actions,
mostly on sales of horses - but occasionally on sales of wool,8 wine,7
or fish.8 The only substantive issue joined is on the fact of the
warranty, 9 although a seller will sometimes save the issue of the
existence of the defect by way of a clause of protestando or non
cognoscendo.10 Everyone seemed to know, then, that these were
really promise cases only very thinly disguised as torts; and that
probably accounts for the fact that no such cases seem to have
appeared in the King's Bench. That court had no jurisdiction over
promises.
IV. CONCLUSION
It was of course conceded by all fourteenth-century lawyers that
common-law actions on mere promises should be supported by a
writing. Partly, no doubt, this was a concession to the shortness of
time and a desire to reserve for the already over-worked and under-
staffed central courts only important cases. But it may mainly have
had to do with an uneasiness about proof of unwritten undertak-
ings; and soon the rule requiring a written instrument came to have
a theoretical basis: duties to act beyond those imposed by common
right, that is longstanding social arrangement, required a
" specialty "- i.e., evidence of the special exception to the ordi-
nary order of things-just as an exception to common law required
a special ley. 1 All this is well enough for professional lawyers, but
it must have produced a great deal of distress in ordinary people
who wanted their promise cases, for one reason or another, in the
king's court. For them, the jurisdictional barrier must have seemed
nonsensical and unjust.
The assumpsit and warranty cases became the vehicles by which
this injustice was overcome. Assumpsit was usually used in the case
of a promise negligently performed; but the rolls of Richard II's
reign reveal a number of pleaded cases of what in the fifteenth
century would be called non-feasance. 1 2 It is true that most of these
cases contained a tricky allegation that could have been used to
4 Y.B. 7 Rich. 2, Lincoln's Inn Hale MS. 77, f. 206.
5 See, e.g., CP/40/5291I97v.
6 CP/40/548/234v. 7 CP/40/527/410.
s CP/40/548/157.
9 See, e.g., CP/40/501/485v.
10 See, e.g., CP/40/510/465. I take it this is done in order to allow evidence of
the quality of the goods to be submitted to the jury.
11 The idea that a promise was a private law finds occasional expression in the
Year Books. See, e.g., Year Book 5 Edward 1i, 30, 31 (G. J. Turner & T. F. T.
Plucknett, eds., 1947).
12 1 will deal with these fully in my projected volume of fourteenth-century trespass
cases now in preparation for the Selden Society.
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good purpose: they alleged that the promise had not been per-
formed on time." Of course, if it were performed, but performed
late, the plaintiff could easily argue that it was not a case of pure
non-feasance. If no work were performed at all, however, the
plaintiff's difficulty seems greater; but he might argue that the
defendant has disabled himself because he can now never perform
the promise precisely since the time has run out, and thus is guilty
of something more than mere inactivity. All these arguments might
have been made, but nothing even remotely like this is in evidence
in the Year Books until the fifteenth century.' 4 Besides, there is an
occasional case in the rolls for breaches that could not even colour-
ably be called misfeasance, as against a landlord for failing in his
undertaking to repair."
The warranty actions are always taken on writs alleging fraud,
but the invariable issue was on the warranty; and it is not likely
that a jury which found an express warranty would be terribly
scrupulous about the scienter element. Besides, the issue on the
warranty seems to exclude consideration of knowledge of the defect.
We all know, anyway, how human it is to feel cheated or mistreated
when an expectation raised by the statement of another is disap-
pointed, how easy it is, in other words, to make a tort out of what
may have been only a breach of contract. But the main point to be
made about the assumpsit and warranty cases must surely be the
same: in them the strong ethical tenet, that promises should be
kept, overcomes the technical barrier of a writing which profes-
sional lawyers had erected. Ethical ideas have a way of being
avenged; and the success of the warranty cases and particularly of
assumpsit is nothing more nor less than covenant taking its revenge.
In relatively modern times we have seen another instance of the
same kind in the ill treatment received by the Statute of Frauds.
Left to its own devices, that is freed of the rule of the seal, the idea
of promise would probably have thrown out the same kind of
penumbra that trespass did. We in fact do hear tentatively of
"covenant on the case "; and are told, occasionally, that some
actions not called covenant really are actions of covenant. What
we must come to see is that all these actions discussed ought to be
viewed intellectually as a unit, as the manifestation of an assump-
tion about the way the world ought to be ordered and the way
people are expected to behave. I have tried to show what may seem
to be very little, no more, perhaps, than that the capital "C" ought
13 See, e.g., CP/40[547/530.
14 The cases are collected in C. H. S. Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common
Law: Tort and Contract (1949), pp. 340-357.
15 KB/271506/8v.
C.L.J.
The Cambridge Law Journal
to be dropped from the phrase "Action of Covenant." But we have
only recently learned not to be beguiled by the intricate grid of the
writ system and to look beneath to the elementary ethical principles
the law was designed in some measure to support. 6 It is imperative
that we cultivate this hard-won insight into a genuine habit of mind
since medieval juries often had unbridled power to decide cases; and
we must always keep it squarely in mind that common-law rules of
liability are to be discovered by reconstructing the common social
assumptions on which the jury relied. One such assumption, that
promises should be kept, requires that we make of covenant not a
writ, but a category for the source of obligations. 17 Unless we do that,
I do not think that we can ever hope to see the main outlines of
Maitland's seamless web, or penetrate the mystery of that undifferenti-
ated wrong, that injuria, that accused tortfeasor and debtor alike were
forced to deny.'
16 Professor Milsom has urged this point in many of his writings. See e.g., "Reason
in the Development of the Common Law" (1964) 81 L.Q.R. 496.
17 A similar point is made in Milsom, "Not Doing is no Trespass: A view of
the Boundaries of Case " [1954] C.L.J. 105.
Is Injuria is rendered tort in Year Book French. The transcendant character of
the word is illustrated by Westcote's remarks in Year Book 2 & 3 Edward H1, 84,
85 (F. W. Maitland, ed., 1904): "We say that you yourself leased the house
etc. and by your deed bound yourself to warrant and defend. That you have not
done, and so we do affirm a wrong [tort] in your person, namely a breach of
covenant."
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